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Abstract—Due to the broadcast nature of wireless communi-
cations, physical layer security has always been a fundamental
but challenging concern. Fortunately, the recent advance of
Intelligent Reflecting Surface (IRS) introduces another dimen-
sion for secure wireless communications by reconfiguring the
transmission environments. In this paper, we devise secure
transmission environments for multi-user MISO systems by
collaboratively leveraging multiple IRSs. Specifically, achievable
secrecy rate represents the amount of information per unit time
that can be securely sent through a communication link, which
is an important criterion for measuring secure communication.
To guarantee the worst-case achievable secrecy rate among
multiple legitimate users, we formulate a max-min problem and
adopt an alternative optimization method to decouple multiple
variables. Based on semidefinite relaxation and successive convex
approximation, each sub-problem can be further converted into
convex problem and easily solved. Extensive experimental results
demonstrate that the proposed scheme can adapt to complex
scenario for multiple users and achieve the significant gain in
terms of achievable secrecy rate. To show the gap between
the proposed problem and the traditional sum-rate problem,
we also evaluate the performance sum-rate problem and make
the comparison. The results show that performance of max-min
problem converges to the performance of sum-rate problem in
terms of the sum of secrecy rate with the increase of elements
on IRSs.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, intelligent reflecting
surface, achievable secrecy rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the broadcast nature of wireless signals, it is vul-
nerable for user’s confidential messages in wireless communi-
cations. To safeguard communication security, physical layer
security, which can be traced back to 1970’s Wyner’s seminal
work [1, 2, 3], has been regarded as a fundamental issue
and a key complement to higher-layer encryption techniques
[4, 5]. In traditional communication systems, beamforming
and Artificial Noise (AN) are considered as two effective
approaches to degrade wiretap channel and achieve secure
communication. By exploiting multiple antennas and shaped
beams, beamforming technology can be implemented to direct
the signal towards the legitimate user and thus reduce the
signal leakage. In addition to beamforming, AN technology
can create significant interference and lower the SINR at
eavesdroppers by properly designing AN signals. Thus, the
achievable secrecy rate, which is a widely used criterion
to represent the difference between mutual information of
“Alice-Bob” channel and “Alice-Eve” channel and measure the
security level, can be effectively improved especially when the
channel state of transmitter-user and transmitter-eavesdropper
are highly correlative during the transmission. Nevertheless,
due to the complex environment of wireless communication,
the proposed approaches do not always work as expected.
As a promising technology for achieving smart radio envi-
ronment/intelligent radio environment in the next generation
cellular system [6, 7], Intelligent Reflecting Surfaces (IRSs)
can provide reconfigurable signal propagation environments
to support cost-effective and power-efficient wireless com-
munication services. In specific, IRS is a metasurface com-
posed of a large number of passive reflecting elements, it
consumes much lower energy compared with traditional active
relays/transceivers [8, 9]. By adaptively adjusting the reflection
amplitude and/or phase shift of each element, the strength
and direction of the incident electromagnetic wave becomes
highly controllable. Thus, IRS is regarded as a novel solu-
tion to achieve configurable wireless environment/intelligent
radio environment/wireless 2.0 with low hardware/energy cost,
and has been applied in various wireless applications such
as coverage extension, interference cancellation and energy
efficiency enhancement [6, 8, 10]. Due to the aforementioned
advantages, the IRS-assisted communication system has great
potential to benefit physical layer security. By jointly optimiz-
ing operations on transmitter and passive reflecting elements
of IRS, the transmitter-user channel state can be reconfigured
and avoid the signal leakage to eavesdropper. Intuitively, users
geographically close to the IRS are more likely beneficial from
IRS by receiving the tuned signal, whose achievable secrecy
rate can be significantly improved.
Recently, some efforts have been done to study IRS-assisted
system for physical layer security. Cui et al. [11] investigated
an IRS-aided secure wireless communication system where
a simple scenario with one eavesdropper is conducted to
show the effectiveness of IRS. To explore the effectiveness
of traditional approach in IRS-assisted scenarios, Guan et
al. [5] further considered AN in an IRS-assisted system,
whose performance was verified with the significant gain of
secrecy rate. To improve the algorithm efficiency, Yu et al.
[12] proposed an efficient algorithm adopted Block Coordinate
Descent (BCD) and minorization maximization method for
faster convergence especially for large-scale IRS. Dong et al.
[13] also adopted a similar efficient design for Mutiple-Input
Mutiple-Output (MIMO) systems. Lyu et al. [14] considered
a potential IRS threat called IRS jamming attack, which can
leverage signals from a transmitter by controlling reflected
signals to diminish the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio
at the user. Since the IRS jammer operates in passive way, it
can be even harder to defend. Xu et al. [15] studied resource
allocation design in multi-user scenario and also considered
AN at transmitter. However, the aforementioned efforts only
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2focus on the proof of work by implementing a single IRS.
Thus, the security gain of collaboratively leveraging multiple
IRSs has not been explored yet, it is critical to jointly optimize
wireless environments and allocate resources for legitimate
users in multiple IRSs-assisted systems.
To guarantee the security of confidential messages from
users, in this paper, we study the secure transmission mecha-
nism for multi-user Mutiple-Input Singe-Output (MISO) sys-
tems assisted by multiple IRSs. The main contributions of this
paper are summarized as follows:
• To deal with the threat of potential eavesdroppers, we pro-
pose a secure communication scheme in multiple IRSs-
assisted system. Considering the security requirement
for each legitimate user in the system, we formulate a
max-min problem to maximize the lower bound of the
security performance to guarantee the worst performance
of multiple users in case the eavesdropper “steal” too
much useful information from a certain user.
• To solve the formulated max-min problem, an alternating
algorithm is adopted to decouple different variables. In
each iteration, only one type of variable is considered and
the other variables are fixed, then we apply SemiDefinite
Relaxation (SDR) and Successive Convex Approximation
(SCA) method to obtain a convex optimization problem,
which makes the original problem can be easily solved.
• To verify the effectiveness of the proposed scheme, exten-
sive numerical evaluations are conducted. Compared with
the traditional IRS scheme with beamforming, the results
show that the proposed scheme can achieve significant
improvement, and the additional AN can improve achiev-
able secrecy rate in some degree especially in multi-
user scenarios. Meanwhile, we also make the comparison
with the traditional sum-rate problem to show the gap of
security performance. With the increase of elements on
IRSs, it shows that the performance of max-min problem
converges to the performance of sum-rate problem in
terms of sum of secrecy rate.
Symbol Notation: Boldface lowercase and uppercase letters
denote vectors and matrices, respectively. For a vector a, | |a| |
denotes the Euclidean norm. For matrix A, the conjugate
transpose, rank and trace of A are denoted as AH , Rank(A)
and Tr(A), respectively. For a complex number c, |c | denotes
the modulus. angle(c) denotes the phase of the complex value
c. The set of n-by-m real matrices, complex matrices and com-
plex Hermitian matrices are denoted as by Rn×m, Cn×m and
Hn×m, respectively. A  0 means A is a positive semidefinite
matrix, and N(µ,∑) denotes Gaussian distribution with mean
and covariance matrix
∑
.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a wireless communication system as shown in
Fig. 1, a base station equipped with M antennas intends to
transmit confidential messages to I legitimate users equipped
with single antenna. Meanwhile, K IRSs have been deployed
in advance to assist wireless communication, and each IRS
has N reflecting elements.
Adversary Model: Concerning to the valuable information
containing in the confidential messages, one eavesdropper
(Eve) wants to wiretap users’ signals, and further crack the
confidential messages to steal users’ private information or
hack users’ equipments. To eliminate the potential threat from
eavesdropper and guarantee the security of legitimate users, the
base station and IRSs need to cooperatively transmit signals
to increase received signal power at legitimate users and also
degrade the signal leakage at the eavesdropper. In this paper,
we try to adjust the transmission strategy at base station and
also on IRSs to improve the security level of the system.
Channel Model: There are two parts of channel experi-
enced from base station to users/Eve, i.e., direct (transmitter-
users/Eve) channel and reflecting (transmitter-IRS-users/Eve)
channel. The composite reflecting channel is modeled as a
combination of three components, i.e., the base station to IRS
link, IRS’s reflection with phase shift and IRS to users/Eve
link. The baseband equivalent channels from the base station
to k-th IRS, i-th user and Eve are denoted by GHk ∈ CN×M ,
hHi ∈ C1×M , hHe ∈ C1×M , respectively. The baseband equiva-
lent channels from k-th IRS to i-th user and Eve are denoted
by gH
i,k
∈ C1×N , gHe ∈ C1×N , respectively. Since the IRS is a
passive reflecting device, we consider a Time Division Duplex-
ing (TDD) protocol for uplink and downlink transmissions and
quasi-static flat-fading model (constant within the transmission
frame) is adopted for all channels. As discussed in [5], by
applying various channel acquisition methods, we also assume
that the Channel State Information (CSI) of all channels are
perfectly known. Linear transmit precoding is considered at
the base station similar to [9], each user served by the base
station is assigned with one dedicated beamforming vector. To
further enhance the physical layer security, additional AN is
also adopted. Thus, the signal transmitted from the base station
to the i-th user can be described as:
xi = ωisi + zi, i = 1, ...U, (1)
where ωi ∈ CM×1 is the beamforming vector for i-th user, si
is the corresponding transmitted data and zi ∈ CM×1 is AN
vector.
Since multiple IRSs have been deployed in the system,
each legitimate user can be served by a selected IRS to
receive tuned signal, which is effective especially when there
exists obstacle and no Light-of-Sight (LoS) channel between
base station and user. Let αi,k ∈ {0, 1} denote the IRS
selection for i-th user, i.e., i-th user can receive reflecting
signal through k-th IRS if αi,k = 1. Meanwhile, let Θk =
diag(Ak,1e jθk,1, ..., Ak,N e jθk,N ) ∈ CN×N denote the diagonal
phase-shifting matrix of k-th IRS, while Ak,n ∈ [0, 1] and
θk,n ∈ [0, 2pi) denote amplitude reflection coefficient and the
phase shift of n-th element on k-th IRS. In practice, each
element of the IRS is usually designed to maximize the signal
reflection [9]. Thus, we set Ak,n = 1 in this paper. In this case,
for i-th user, the received signal from base station and IRS can
be represented by:
yi =(
K∑
k=1
αi,kg
H
i,kΘkG
H
k + h
H
i )(ωisi + zi)+
3  	
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Fig. 1. System model of IRSs-assisted secure transmission.
∑
j,i
(
K∑
k=1
αj,kg
H
i,kΘkG
H
k + h
H
i )(ω j si + z j) + n0, (2)
where n0 ∈ CN(0, σ2) is the complex Additive White Gaus-
sian Noise (AWGN). For eavesdropper, the received signal can
be represented by:
yei =(
K∑
k=1
αi,kg
H
e,kΘkG
H
k + h
H
e )(ωisi + zi)∑
j,i
(
K∑
k=1
αj,kg
H
e,kΘkG
H
k + h
H
e )(ω j si + z j) + n0. (3)
For notation simplicity, let Dˆi j =
K∑
k=1
αj,kg
H
i,k
ΘkG
H
k + h
H
i ∈
C1×M , De,i =
K∑
k=1
αi,kg
H
e,k
ΘkG
H
k + h
H
e ∈ C1×M . Accordingly,
the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SINR) of received signal at i-th
user can be calculated by:
SINRi =
|(
K∑
k=1
αi,kg
H
i,k
ΘkG
H
k + h
H
i )ωi |2∑
j,i
|(Dˆi jω j |2 + ∑
j∈U
|Dˆi j z j |2 + N0
, (4)
where N0 is the power of AWGN. Similarly, the SINR of i-th
user’s signal at the eavesdropper can be calculated by:
SINRei =
|(
K∑
k=1
αi,kg
H
e,k
ΘkG
H
k + h
H
e )ωi |2∑
j,i
|De, jω j |2 + ∑
j∈U
|De, j z j |2 + N0 . (5)
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND SOLUTION
Considering the security requirement for each legitimate
user in the system, we want to guarantee the worst per-
formance of all legitimate users in case eavesdropper might
wiretap too much useful information from a certain user. Thus,
in this paper, we aim to maximize the minimum achievable
secrecy rate of legitimate users in the system. By jointly
configuring the beamforming matrix ω¯ = [ω1,ω2...,ωI ] and
AN matrix z¯ = [z1, z2..., z I ] at the base station, phase shift
matrix Θ¯ = [Θ1,Θ2, ...,ΘK ] at IRSs and surface selection
matrix α¯ =

α1,1 ... α1,K
... ... ...
αI,1 ... αI,K
 between users and IRSs, the
optimization problem can be formulated as:
Problem 1 : max
ω¯, z¯,Θ¯,α¯
min
i
[Rui − Rei ]+ (6)
s.t . | |ωi | |2 + | |zi | |2 ≤ Pmax, ∀i ∈ U, (C1)
|e jθk,n | = 1, k ∈ [1,K], ∀n ∈ [1, N], (C2)∑
k
αi,k = 1, αi,k ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ U, (C3)
where (C1) represents the transmission power constraint, (C2)
limits the unit modulus for each element and (C3) indicates
that each user should be served by one IRS in the system.
Considering the SINR expression in (4), (5) and Shannon
equation, the achievable secrecy rate (bits/s/Hz) in (6) can be
calculated by:
Rui − Rei = log2(1 +
|(
K∑
k=1
αi,kg
H
i,k
ΘkGHk + h
H
i )ωi |2∑
j,i
|(Dˆi jω j |2 + ∑
j∈U
|Dˆi j z j |2 + N0
)
− log2(1 +
|(
K∑
k=1
αi,kg
H
e,k
ΘkGHk + h
H
e )ωi |2∑
j,i
|(De, jω j |2 + ∑
j∈U
|De, j z j |2 + N0 ). (7)
It is intuitive to know that variables ω¯, z¯, Θ¯ and α¯ in
Problem 1 are coupled, which makes Problem 1 difficult
to solve. However, if only one variable is considered, the
original problem becomes solvable when the other variables
are fixed. Inspired by the alternating optimization approaches
in [5, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16], we adopt BCD technique to
decouple variables and get the sub-optimal solution efficiently.
To optimize a multi-variable objective in BCD method, we
optimize the objective in terms of one of the coordinate blocks
while the other blocks are fixed at each iteration. In the next,
Problem 1 is divided into three sub-problems and each sub-
problem is solved iteratively as descried in Algorithm 1. For
each sub-problem, we utilize SDR and SCA to convert the
original problem into a convex problem. The detailed solving
process of each sub-problem is descried in the following sub-
sections.
5W i F3i (W i, Z i) = 0, 5Z i F3i (W i, Z i) =
1
ln2
(DˆHi, j Dˆi, j)H∑
j,i
(Tr(W j DˆHi, j Dˆi, j) +
∑
j∈U
Tr(Z j DˆHi, j Dˆi, j) + N0
, (8)
45W i F4i (W i, Z i) =
1
ln2
(DHe, jDe, j)H
Tr(W iDHe,iDe,i) +
∑
j,i
(Tr(W jDHe, jDe, j) +
∑
j∈U
Tr(Z jDHe, jDe, j) + N0
, (9)
5Z i F4i (W i, Z i) =
1
ln2
(DHe, jDe, j)H
Tr(W iDHe,iDe,i) +
∑
j,i
(Tr(W jDHe, jDe, j) +
∑
j∈U
Tr(Z jDHe, jDe, j) + N0
. (10)
Algorithm 1: BCD-based Algorithm
Input: Number of elements N , number of antennas M ,
number of surfaces K;
Output: Beamforming vector ω¯, AN vector z¯, phase
-shift matrix Θ¯ and IRS selection vector α¯;
1 Initialize:
• Initialize ω¯(0), z¯(0), Θ¯(0) and α¯(0)
• t = 0, ∆(t) = Intmax;
2 while ∆(t) < δ do
3 Solve each sub-problem to find solution for ω¯(t+1),
z¯(t+1), Θ¯(t+1) and α¯(t+1) for given ω¯(t), z¯(t), Θ¯(t) and
α¯(t), respectively;
4 Calculate ρ(t+1) = min
i
[Rui − Rei ];
5 Update t = t + 1 and ∆(t) = ρ(t+1) − ρ(t);
6 end
A. Sub-Problem for Beamforming and AN
At first, beamforming and AN matrixes are considered to be
solved. For given phase shift operation Θ¯ and surface matching
α¯, we can rewrite Problem 1 as:
Problem 2a : max
ω¯, z¯
min
i
[Rui − Rei ]+ (11)
s.t . | |ωi | |2 + | |zi | |2 ≤ Pmax, ∀i ∈ U. (C1)
To solve this sub-problem for beamforming and AN, we refor-
mulate the objective with some mathematical transformations
at first. Let W i = ωiωHi ∈ CM×M , Z i = zi zHi ∈ CM×M , Di =
K∑
k=1
αi,kg
H
i,k
ΘkG
H
k + h
H
i ∈ C1×M , Dˆi j =
K∑
k=1
αj,kg
H
i,k
ΘkG
H
k +
hHi ∈ C1×M , De,i =
K∑
k=1
αi,kg
H
e,k
ΘkG
H
k + h
H
e ∈ CMe×M . Then,
the achievable secrecy rate can be reformulated as:
Rui − Rei = log2(1 +
Tr(W iDHi Di )∑
j,i
((Tr(W j DˆHi, j Dˆi, j ) +
∑
j∈U
Tr(Z j DˆHi, j Dˆi, j ) + N0
)
− log2(1 +
Tr(W iDHe, iDe, i )∑
j,i
(Tr(W jDHe, jDe, j ) +
∑
j∈U
Tr(Z jDHe, jDe, j ) + N0
),
= log2(
Tr(W iDHi Di ) +
∑
j,i
Tr(W j DˆHi j Dˆi j ) +
∑
j∈U
Tr(Z j DˆHi j Dˆi j ) + N0∑
j,i
Tr(W j DˆHi j Dˆi j ) +
∑
j∈U
Tr(Z j DˆHi j Dˆi j ) + N0
·
∑
j,i
Tr(W jDHe, jDe, j ) +
∑
j∈U
Tr(Z jDHe, jDe, j ) + N0
Tr(W iDHe, iDe, i ) +
∑
j,i
Tr(W jDHe, jDe, j ) +
∑
j∈U
Tr(Z jDHe, jDe, j ) + N0
),
= −(F1i + F1i + F3i + F4i ), (12)
where F1i , F
1
i , F
3
i and F
4
i are represented by:
F1i = −log2(Tr(W iDHi Di )
+
∑
j,i
(Tr(W j DˆHi, j Dˆi, j ) +
∑
j∈U
Tr(Z j DˆHi, j Dˆi, j ) + N0), (13)
F2i = −log2(
∑
j,i
Tr(W jDHe, jDe, j ) +
∑
j∈U
Tr(Z jDHe, jDe, j ) + N0), (14)
F3i = log2(
∑
j,i
(Tr(W j DˆHi, j Dˆi, j ) +
∑
j∈U
Tr(Z j DˆHi, j Dˆi, j ) + N0), (15)
F4i = log2(Tr(W iDHe, iDe, i )
+
∑
j,i
(Tr(W jDHe, jDe, j ) +
∑
j∈U
Tr(Z jDHe, jDe, j ) + N0). (16)
However, the secrecy rate Rui − Rei in (12) is still in the
form of Difference of Convex (DC) functions. To solve the
DC problem in (12), we adopt SCA method [15, 17, 18, 19]
to obtain a convex upper bound for the DC objective in an
iterative manner. At first, we construct global overestimators of
F3i and F
4
i , respectively. For any feasible solution (W (t)i , Z (t)i ),
the differentiable convex functions F3i (W i, Z i) and F4i (W i, Z i)
satisfy the following inequalities1:
F3i (W i, Z i) ≤ F3i (W (t)i , Z (t)i )
+ Tr(5W iF3i (W (t)i , Z (t)i )H (W i −W (t)i ))
+ Tr(5Z iF3i (W (t)i , Z (t)i )H (Z i − Z (t)i ))
= F˜3i (W i, Z i,W (t)i , Z (t)i ), (17)
F4i (W i, Z i) ≤ F4i (W (t)i , Z (t)i )
+ Tr(5W iF4i (W (t)i , Z (t)i )H (W i −W (t)i ))
+ Tr(5Z iF4i (W (t)i , Z (t)i )H (Z i − Z (t)i ))
= F˜4i (W i, Z i,W (t)i , Z (t)i ), (18)
where the right hand side terms in (17) and (18) are global
overestimations of F3i and F
4
i by using first-order Taylor
approximation, respectively. The gradients of functions F3i and
F4i with respect to W i and Z i are given as (8)-(10). Hence,
a convex upper bound of objective function in (12) can be
obtained as Rui − Rei = −(F1i + F2i + F˜3i + F˜4i ).
After deploying SCA, the objective function becomes con-
vex. In order to further solve the max-min problem, we also
introduce an auxiliary variable x into the formulation. By
doing so, the original Problem 2a can be transformed as:
Problem 2b : min
x,W,Z
x (19)
1Since F3i and F
4
i are concave functions, according to the definition of
concave function, we have (1 − λ) f (x) + λ f (y) ≤ f ((1 − λ)x + λy). In this
case, we can construct global overestimator f (y) ≤ f ((1−λ)x+λy)−(1−λ) f (x)λ =
f (x) + f (x+λ(y−x))− f (x)λ → f (x) + 5 f (x)(y − x) as λ → 0 [20, Proposition
1.8].
5s.t . Tr(W ) + Tr(Z) ≤ Pmax, ∀i ∈ U, (C1)
x ≥ F1i + F2i + F˜3i + F˜4i , ∀i ∈ U, (C4)
Rank(W i) = 1, Rank(Z i) = 1, ∀i ∈ U, (C5)
W i  0, Z i  0, ∀i ∈ U. (C6)
Since constraint (C5) is non-convex, we drop this rank-1 con-
straint by applying SDR. If the obtained solution (W (t)i , Z (t)i )
are of rank-1, they can be written as W (t)i = ωiω
H
i and
Z (t)i = zi z
H
i , then the optimal beamforming vector ωi and
AN zi can be obtained by applying eigenvalue decomposition.
Otherwise, we can adopt Gaussian Randomization to recover
ωi and zi approximately from higher rank solution (W (t)i , Z (t)i )
[21, 22, 23]. In this case, Problem 2b becomes a convex
optimization problem. In Algorithm 2, Problem 2b can be ef-
ficiently solved at each iteration by using convex optimization
solvers, e.g., SeduMi and CVX. In the following, we prove that
SCA-based approach in Algorithm 2 in can reach the optimal
solution at each iteration.
Proposition 1. Algorithm 2 generates a sequence of non-
decreasing feasible solutions that converge to a point (W ∗, Z∗)
satisfying the KKT conditions of the original problems.
Proof. For notation convenience, let fi(W i, Z i) = (F1i + F2i +
F3i +F
4
i ) and gi(W i, Z i) = (F1i +F2i + F˜3i + F˜4i ). The constraint
(C4) can be rewritten as x ≥ max
i
{gi(W i, Z i)}.
According to (17) and (18), we can have fi(W i, Z i) ≤
gi(W i, Z i), ∀i ∈ U. This means that the optimal solution
(W (t), Z (t)) of the approximated problem (19) at t-th iteration
always belongs to the feasible set of the original Prob-
lem (11) since constraints (C1), (C4) and (C6) are always
satisfied. Meanwhile, we can have max
i
{ fi(W (t)i , Z (t)i )} ≤
max
i
{gi(W (t)i , Z (t)i )}, ∀W, Z ∈ CIM×IM . At each iteration, it
follows that [24, 25]:
max
i
{ fi(W (t)i , Z (t)i )} ≤ maxi {gi(W
(t)
i , Z
(t)
i )}
= min
W,Z
max
i
{gi(W i, Z i)}
≤ max
i
{gi(W (t−1)i , Z (t−1)i )}
= max
i
{gi(W (t−1)i , Z (t−1)i )},
where the second inequality is because for (19), (W (t), Z (t)) is
globally optimum at t-th iteration, and the last equality holds
because gi(W (t−1), Z (t−1)) = fi(W (t−1), Z (t−1)). This means
that {max
i
{ fi(W (t)i , Z (t)i )}|t = 0, 1, ...} is a monotonically de-
creasing sequence. As the actual objective value of (19) is
nonincreasing after every iteration, Algorithm 2 will eventually
converge to a point (W ∗, Z∗) as t increases.
Next, we prove that (W ∗, Z∗) satisfies the KKT conditions
of the original problem. For (19), the optimal solution can be
found when x = max
i
{gi(W i, Z i)}, thus, Problem 2b can be
rewritten as:
min
x,W,Z
max
i
{gi(W i, Z i)} (20)
s.t . (C1), (C6).
Algorithm 2: SCA-based Algorithm
Input: Number of elements N , number of antennas M ,
number of surfaces K;
Output: Beamforming W (0), Z (0);
1 Initialize:
• Initialize W (0), Z (0), t = 1, ∆(t) = Intmax;
2 while ∆(t) < δ do
3 Solve problem (19) to find solution for W (t), Z (t);
4 Update t = t + 1 and ∆(t) = x(t+1) − x(t);
5 end
Then, the Lagrangian of (20) is:
L(W, Z, µ) = max
i
{gi(W i, Z i)} +
∑
i∈U
µi(Tr(W i) + Tr(Z i)),
where µi is Lagrange multiplier for each constraint. Similar to
(19), by adopting mathematical transformations and introduc-
ing auxiliary variable x, the Lagrangian of the original problem
(11) can be written as:
L ′(W, Z, µ) = max
i
{ fi(W i, Z i)} +
∑
i∈U
µi(Tr(W i) + Tr(Z i)),
For a feasible point (W (t−1), Z (t−1)) obtained by Algorithm 2
at t − 1-th iteration, it is the global optimum for (20), the
KKT conditions of (20) must be satisfied, i.e., (W (t−1), Z (t−1))
is feasible for (20) and there exist nonnegative real values
ui, i ∈ U satisfying:
5 L(W (t−1), Z (t−1), µ)|W,Z = 0,
µi(Tr(W (t−1)i ) + Tr(Z (t−1)i )) = 0, ∀i ∈ U.
Since the gradient of the first-order Taylor approximations
F˜3i (W i, Z i) and F˜4i (W i, Z i) are the same as F3i (W i, Z i) and
F4i (W i, Z i), we can also verify that:
5 L ′(W, Z, µ)|W=W (t−1) = 5L(W, Z, µ)|W=W (t−1),
5 L ′(W, Z, µ)|Z=Z (t−1) = 5L(W, Z, µ)|Z=Z (t−1) .
which means that (W (t−1), Z (t−1)) satisfies the KKT conditions
for (11). The results imply that the KKT conditions of the
original will be satisfied after the series of approximations
converges to the point (W ∗, Z∗). This completes the proof.

B. Subproblem for Phase Shift
For given beamforming matrix ω¯, AN matrix z¯ and surface
selection matrix α¯, we can rewrite Problem 1 as:
Problem 3a : max
Θ¯
min
i
[Rui − Rei ]+ (21)
s.t . |e jθk,n | = 1, k ∈ [1,K], ∀n ∈ [1, N]. (C2)
Next, similar to the procedures in the previous section III-
A, we also transform the objective function to a solvable
convex function by applying SDR and SCA. Let Gi,k =
6αi,kdiag(gHi,k)GHk ∈ CN×M 2, Gˆi, j,k = αj,kdiag(gHi,k)GHk ∈
CN×M . Let κi,k = Gi,kωi ∈ CN×1, κˆi, j,k = Gˆi, j,kω j ∈ CN×1,
µk = [e jθ1, e jθ2, ..., e jθN ] ∈ C1×N and µk,n = e jθk,n . Then, the
power of received signal at i-th user in (4) becomes:
|(
K∑
k=1
αi,kg
H
i,kΘkG
H
k ωi + h
H
i )ωi |2 = |
K∑
k=1
µkκi,k + h
H
i ωi |2.
Accordingly, the power of received signal of i-th user at
eavesdropper in (5) becomes:
|(
K∑
k=1
αi,kg
H
e,kΘkG
H
k ωi + h
H
i )ωi |2 = |
K∑
k=1
µkκe,k + h
H
e ωi |2.
Furthermore, let v = [µ1, µ2, ..., µK ] ∈ C1×NK , and ai =[κi,1; κi,2; ...; κi,K ] ∈ CNK×1, aˆi, j = [κˆi, j,1; κˆi, j,2; ...; κˆi, j,K ] ∈
CNK×1. Thus, we have
K∑
k=1
µH
k
κi,k = vai . Let bi =
hHi ωi , bˆi, j = h
H
i ω j , Gei,k = αi,kdiag(gHe,k)Gk , bei =
hHe ωi . Also, let κˆ
noise
i, j,k = Gˆi, j,k zi ∈ CN×1, anoisei, j =
[κnoise
i, j,1 ; κ
noise
i, j,2 ; ...; κ
noise
i, j,K ] ∈ CNK×1, ci, j = hHi z j . Then,
achievable secrecy rate in (7) can be reformulated as:
Rui − Rei = log2(1 +
|vai + bi |2∑
j,i
|vaˆi, j + bˆi, j |2 + ∑
j∈U
|vanoisei, j + ci, j |2 + N0
)
− log2(1 +
|vaei + bei |2∑
j,i
|vae, j + bej |2 +
∑
j∈U
|vanoisee, j + ce, j |2 + N0
). (22)
Note that |vai + bi |2 = v˜HRi v˜, and v˜HRi v˜ = trace(Ri v˜ v˜H ).
Define V = v˜ v˜H , which needs to satisfy V  0 and Rank(V ) =
1. Note that Ri = [aiaHi , aibHi ; biaHi , 0] ∈ CNK+1×NK+1,
Rˆi, j = [aˆi, j aˆHi, j, aˆi, j bˆHi, j ; bˆi, j aˆHi, j, 0] ∈ CNK+1×NK+1, Rnoisei, j =
[anoisei, j anoiseHi, j , anoisei, j cHi, j ; ci, j anoiseHi, j , 0] ∈ CNK+1×NK+1, v˜ =
[v, 1]H ∈ CNK+1×1. Then (22) can be further reformulated as:
Rui − Rei = −(F1i + F2i + F3i + F4i ), (23)
where F1i , F
1
i , F
3
i and F
4
i are:
F1i = −log2(Tr(RiV ) + |bi |2 +
∑
j,i
(Tr(Rˆi, jV ) + |bˆi, j |2)
+
∑
j∈U
(Tr(Rnoisei, j V ) + |ci, j |2) + N0), (24)
F2i = −log2(
∑
j,i
(Tr(Rˆe, jV ) + |bˆe, j |2)
+
∑
j∈U
(Tr(Rnoisee, j V ) + |ce, j |2) + N0), (25)
F3i = log2(
∑
j,i
(Tr(Rˆi, jV ) + |bˆi, j |2)
+
∑
j∈U
(Tr(Rnoisei, j V ) + |ci, j |2) + N0), (26)
F4i = log2(Tr(ReV ) + |bei |2 +
∑
j,i
(Tr(Rˆe, jV ) + |bˆe, j |2)
2Due to A ·diag(e jθ1, e jθ2, ..., e jθN ) = [e jθ1, e jθ2, ..., e jθN ] ·diag(A)
when matrix A ∈ C1×N and diag(e jθ1, e jθ2, ..., e jθN ) ∈ CN×N . Thus,
transmitter-IRS-users channel gH
i,k
ΘkG
H
k
= µkdiag(gHi,k )GHk .
+
∑
j∈U
(Tr(Rnoisee, j V ) + |ce, j |2) + N0). (27)
Similarly, we apply SDR method to remove rank-one con-
straint Rank(V ) = 1 and SCA method to construct global
overestimators of F3i and F
4
i and make (23) become convex
function:
F3i (V ) ≤ F3i (V (t)) + Tr(5VF3i (V (t))H (V − V (t)))
= F˜3i (V,V (t)), (28)
F4i (V ) ≤ F3i (V (t)) + Tr(5VF3i (V (t))H (V − V (t)))
= F˜4i (V,V (t)). (29)
Thus, Problem 3a is transformed into a convex problem by
introducing auxiliary variable x:
Problem 3b : min
x,V
x (30)
s.t. |e jθk,n | = 1, k ∈ [1,K], ∀n ∈ [1, N], (C2)
x ≥ F1i + F2i + F˜3i + F˜4i , ∀i ∈ U, (C7)
V  0. (C8)
To restore desired solution Θ = diag(v) from convex
SemiDefinite Program (SDP) solution V , eigenvalue decom-
position with Gaussian randomization can be used to obtain
a feasible solution based on the higher-rank solution obtained
by solving Problem 3b. Since unit modulus constraint (C2)
for each element on IRS should be satisfied, the reflection
coefficients can be obtained by [5, 9]:
µk,n = e
jangle( µk,nµNK+1 ), n = 1, 2, ...NK, (31)
where angle(x) denotes the phase of x and obtained solution
can satisfy |µk,n | = 1.
C. Subproblem for Surface Selection
For given beamforming vector ω¯, AN vector z¯ and phase
shift of IRS Θ, the original problem becomes a 0-1 integer
programming problem, we can rewrite Problem 1 as:
Problem 4a : max
α
min
i
[Rui − Rei ]+ (32)
s.t .
∑
k
αi,k = 1, αi,k ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ U. (C3)
At first, according to the constraint described in (C3), each user
is served by one specific IRS, thus, we can have αi,kαi,k′ = 0
when k , k ′ and
K∑
k=1
∑
k′,K
αi,kαi,k′ =
K∑
k=1
αi,k . Then, we can
simplify the expression in (4) and the power of received signal
at i-th user becomes:
|(
K∑
k=1
αi,k g
H
i,kΘkG
H
k + h
H
i )ωi |2
=
K∑
k=1
∑
k′,K
αi,kαi,k′(Ti,kωi)HTi,kωi︸                                        ︷︷                                        ︸
k2
+(hHi ωi)HhHi ωi
7+
K∑
k=1
αi,k (Ti,kωi)HhHi ωi +
K∑
k=1
αi,kTi,kωi(hHi ωi)H
=
K∑
k=1
αi,k (Ti,kωi)HTi,kωi︸                          ︷︷                          ︸
k
+(hHi ωi)HhHi ωi
+
K∑
k=1
αi,k (Ti,kωi)HhHi ωi +
K∑
k=1
αi,kTi,kωi(hHi ωi)H
=
K∑
k=1
αi,k (Tˆ1i,i,k + Tˆ2i,i,k ) + |bi |2, (33)
where Ti,k = gHi,kΘkG
H
k , Te,k = g
H
e,k
ΘkG
H
k , Tˆ
1
i, j,k
=
(Ti,kω j)HTi,kω j , Tˆ2i, j,k = (Ti,kω j)HhHi ω j + Ti,kω j)(hHi ω j)H .
Similarly, the power of received signal of i-th user at eaves-
dropper in (5) can be expressed as:
|(
K∑
k=1
αi,k g
H
e,kΘkG
H
k + h
H
e )ωi |2 =
K∑
k=1
αi,k (Tˆ1e,i,k + Tˆ2e,i,k ) + |bi |2.
(34)
Furthermore, let ˆTN1i, j,k = (Ti,k z j)HTi,k z j , ˆTN2i, j,k =
(Ti,k z j)HhHi z j + Ti,k z j)(hHi z j)H . In this case, the achievable
secrecy rate in (7) can be reformulated as:
Rui − Rei = F1i + F1i − F3i − F4i ,
where F1i , F
1
i , F
3
i and F
4
i are represented by:
F1i = log2(
K∑
k=1
αi,k (Tˆ 1i, i,k + Tˆ 2i, i,k ) + |bi |2 +
∑
j,i
K∑
k=1
αi,k (Tˆ 1i, j,k + Tˆ 2i, j,k )
+ |bˆi, j |2 +
∑
j∈U
K∑
k=1
αi,k ( ˆTN1i, j,k + ˆTN2i, j,k ) + |ci, j |2 + N0), (35)
F2i = log2(
∑
j,i
K∑
k=1
αi,k (Tˆ 1e, j,k + Tˆ 2e, j,k ) + |bˆe, j |2
+
∑
j∈U
K∑
k=1
αi,k ( ˆTN1e, j,k + ˆTN2e, j,k ) + |ce, j |2 + N0), (36)
F3i = log2(
∑
j,i
K∑
k=1
αi,k (Tˆ 1i, j,k + Tˆ 2i, j,k ) + |bˆi, j |2
+
∑
j∈U
K∑
k=1
αi,k ( ˆTN1i, j,k + ˆTN2i, j,k ) + |ci, j |2 + N0), (37)
F4i = log2(
K∑
k=1
αi,k (Tˆ 1e, i,k + Tˆ 2e, i,k ) + |bi |2 +
∑
j,i
K∑
k=1
αi,k (Tˆ 1e, j,k + Tˆ 2e, j,k )
+ |bˆe, j |2 +
∑
j∈U
K∑
k=1
αi,k ( ˆTN1e, j,k + ˆTN2e, j,k ) + |ce, j |2 + N0). (38)
In order to solve the subproblem, we first relax integer
variable α, then we solve the problem by using convex
optimization. Similarly, we adopt SCA method to construct
global overestimators of F3i and F
4
i :
F3i (α¯i) ≤ F3i (α¯i) + Tr(5α¯iF3i (α¯(t)i )H (α¯i − α¯(t)i ))
= F˜3i (α¯i, α¯(t)i ), (39)
F4i (α¯i) ≤ F3i (α¯i) + Tr(5α¯iF3i (α¯(t)i )H (α¯i − α¯(t)i ))
= F˜4i (α¯i, α¯(t)i ), (40)
 
  	
  		  	 	 	
Fig. 2. Overall setups for numerical evaluation.
where α¯i = [αi,1, ..., αi,K ]. Thus, can be transformed into a
convex problem by introducing auxiliary variable x:
Problem 4b : min
x,α
x (41)
s.t . x ≥ F1i + F2i + F˜3i + F˜4i , ∀i ∈ U, (C9)∑
k
αi,k = 1, αi,k ∈ [0, 1], ∀i ∈ U. (C10)
In this case, Problem 4b becomes a general convex problem.
By solving the convex problem and round the relaxed solution,
we can get integer feasible solution.
IV. NUMERICAL EVALUATION
To evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme, a
series of numerical evaluations are conducted in this section.
The overall setups are shown in Fig. 2, we consider the base
station is located at (10, 0, 10), IRSs and legitimate users are
uniformly distributed around base station for a constant angle
θ∗. The first user and IRS are located at (5, 67, 5) and (8, 67,
2), respectively. The Eve is located at (10, 60, 5) where in the
middle of base station and the first user. We also consider that
the direct channel between base station and users are blocked
by obstacles, which means the channel state of base station
to user is much worse than the channel state of IRS to user.
Specifically, the channel from base station to IRS/users/Eve
is assumed as the distance-dependent path loss model, which
can be generated by h =
√
L0d
−β
ab
h∗, where dab denotes the
distance from location a to location b, and h∗ is the small-
scale fading component assumed to be Rician fading [26, 27]:
h∗ =
√
K
K + 1
h∗LoS +
√
1
K + 1
h∗NLoS, (42)
where h∗LoS and h
∗
NLoS represent the deterministic Line-of-
Sight (LoS) and Rayleigh fading/Non-LoS (NLoS) compo-
nents, respectively. The LoS components are expressed by
the responses of the N-elements uniform linear array h∗LoS =
am(θ)an(θ)H . The array response of an N-element IRS can be
calculated by:
am = exp( j 2pi
λ
dt (m − 1)sinφLoS1 sinθLoS1 ),m = 1, ...,M,
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SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Parameter Value
Carrier frequency 2GHz
IRS configuration
Uniform rectangular array with
5 elements in a row and N/5
columns, 3λ/8 spacing
Path loss exponent
βBU = βBE = 5, βBI = βIU =
βIE = 2, respectively
Rician channel factor
KBU = KBE = 0, KBI = KIU =
KIE = ∞, respectively
Path loss at 1 meter L0 = −30dB
Other parameters
N0 = −174dBm, Tx = 4, δ =
0.001, θ∗ = 20◦
an = exp( j 2pi
λ
dr (m − 1)sinφLoS2 sinθLoS2 ), n = 1, ..., N,
where dt and dr are the inter-antenna separation distance
at the transmitter and receiver, φLoS1 and φLoS2 are LoS
azimuth at base station and IRS, θLoS1 and θLoS2 are the
angle of departure at base station and angle of arrival at IRS,
respectively. The rest of parameter settings are listed in Table
I, and two baselines are considered:
• Baseline 1: Only beamforming is considered at base
station, and IRS is not deployed in the system.
• Baseline 2: Beamforming is considered at base station,
and only one IRS is deployed in the system.
To learn the influence of different number of reflecting
elements N on each IRS, the performance comparison is
shown in Fig. 3. Due to the existence of obstacles, the LoS
component is relatively bad for wireless transmission between
base station and user. When only one user is considered, the
proposed scheme with AN has almost the same performance
as the one without AN, the same conclusion is also verified
by [9]. When there are 2 or more users, additional AN can
help to improve secrecy rate about 4-6% especially with the
increase of N . Without the assistance of IRS and AN, baseline
1 has the worst performance compared with other schemes
since the direct channel between base station and user is
blocked. For fair comparison, we change βBU = βBE = 2
for the beamforming scheme and the result also shows that
the performance of beamforming scheme is relatively bad
when there are multiple users. For baseline 2, since users are
distributed apart from each other, only one IRS cannot satisfy
the requirement of secure communication.
The achievable secrecy rate versus number of users is
shown in Fig. 4. As we can see, the performance of all
schemes in terms of achievable secrecy rate are degrading
rapidly with the increase of users. When there are more
than 2 users, the proposed scheme perform better than AN-
disabled scheme with 5% to 18.9% advantages. Here, for a
fair comparison, we also set βBU = βBE = 2 in baseline 1.
The result also shows that beamforming scheme in baseline 1
can not deal with multiple users scenario. Meanwhile, since the
distance between IRS and users will significantly influence the
performance of IRS-assisted scheme, we also set up a friendly
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Fig. 3. Achievable secrecy rate vs number of elements (Pmax = 40dBm).
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Fig. 4. Achievable secrecy rate vs number of users (Pmax = 40dBm and
N = 20).
scenario to baseline 2, i.e., all users are uniformly located in
the line from (8, 67, 2) to (8, 75, 2). When only single IRS is
deployed, the performance becomes even worse than baseline
1. The reason is that the spatial diversity provided by the IRS
is limited. If the overall performance is considered, e.g., the
sum of secrecy rate, the system still can sacrifice a part of
users’ performance to have a better overall performance. If the
worst performance in the system is considered as the objective,
it becomes hard to optimize since each user matters. In this
case, the algorithm tends to sacrifice the user who has the
highest secrecy rate and make up for the user who has the
worst secrecy rate, but the compensation is not valued due to
the lack of spatial diversity. In this case, a bad performance
is obtained.
The performance of achievable secrecy rate versus trans-
mission power is shown in Fig. 5. The maximum transmission
power ranges from 7W (38.45dBm) to 10W (40dBm). With
the increase of transmission power, the performance of all
schemes increase linearly. Similar to the results in Fig. 4,
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Fig. 5. Achievable secrecy rate vs maximum transmission power (N = 30).
the proposed scheme can have better performance than AN-
disabled scheme when there are more than 2 users in the
system. To have a fair comparison, we also consider LoS
channel is not blocked by obstacle and set βBU = βBE = 2
for baseline 1 with 2 users. However, the result shows that
the performance of baseline 1 is much lower than IRSs-
assisted schemes. For baseline 2, since the performance is
mainly limited by spatial diversity, it remains relatively steady
and increases linearly from 0.9bps/Hz to 0.96bps/Hz with the
increase of transmission power.
In general, fairness problem and overall system performance
are two common objectives considered in wireless commu-
nication. To compare the performance of max-min problem
proposed in this paper with sum-rate problem, we also plot
Fig. 6-7 to show the difference in terms of the sum of secrecy
rate and the minimum secrecy rate, and the problem in (43)
with constraints (C1)-(C3) is adopted as another optimization
problem:
max
ω¯, z¯,Θ¯,α¯
∑
i
[Rui − Rei ]+ (43)
s.t . (C1) − (C3).
As shown in Fig. 6, for the performance in terms of the
minimum secrecy rate, the gap between two objectives can
vary rapidly with different number of elements, especially
for more users scenario, which means sum-rate objective can
hardly guarantee the worst secrecy rate of different users. For
the performance in terms of the sum of secrecy rate, with
the increase of elements, overall sum secrecy rate of these
two objective tends to converge and have similar performance.
This phenomenon indicates that a max-min problem can
achieve better minimum secrecy rate and also reach similar
performance of overall secrecy rate for a large-scale IRS-
assisted system. Meanwhile, in Fig. 7, the sum of secrecy
rate increases with the number of users. Even though it can
sacrifice a part of users’ performance to improve overall
performance, the curve shows that the gain becomes lese and
the sum secrecy rate can reach a threshold with the increase
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of users, which indicates the maximum secrecy capacity in
the system. For the gap between two different objectives,
it also becomes larger with the increase of users, which is
reasonable since the solution space becomes larger with more
users in the system, and different solutions obtained from the
aforementioned objectives can also influence more users.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied physical layer security in multiple
IRSs-assisted systems. In order to guarantee the worst secrecy
performance of multiple users in case eavesdropper might
eavesdrop useful information from a certain user, beamforming
and AN vector at the base station, phase shift matrix at IRSs
and surface selection matrix were jointly considered and a
max-min objective was formulated. Considering the coupled
variables in the objective, an alternative optimization was
adopted and the sub-problems could be solved based on SDP
and SCA. To verify the performance of the proposed scheme,
a series of numerical evaluations were conducted. The results
10
show that the proposed scheme can effectively adapt to the
sophisticated application scenario and the performance can be
significantly improved compared with the traditional schemes.
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